Beccaria: 'On Crimes and Punishments' and Other Writings by Cesare Beccaria, Visit Amazon's Richard Bellamy Page, search

By Cesare Beccaria, Visit Amazon's Richard Bellamy Page, search results, Learn about Author Central, Richard Bellamy, , Richard Davies

During this version of Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments and different writings, Richard Bellamy attracts on contemporary Italian scholarship to teach how Beccaria wove jointly many of the political languages of the Enlightenment right into a political philosophy that mixes republican, contractarian, romantic and liberal in addition to utilitarian topics. This version additionally encompasses a variety of items from Beccaria's writings on political financial system and the historical past of civilization that weren't formerly on hand in English.

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Extra info for Beccaria: 'On Crimes and Punishments' and Other Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)

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They can be lawyers and judges in national courts who value additional international legal instruments to advance their agendas (Burley and Mattli 1993, Alter 2000, Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000). Alternatively, they can be epistemic communities or norm-based networks and social movements, which use international institutions as simply another channel of influence (Haas 1989, Haas 1990, Sikkink 1993, Keck and Sikkink 1998). Such international support or pressure can tip the balance of domestic interest competition (Putnam and Bayne 1984).

Second, states are not unitary. Governments – the primary decisionmakers for international monitoring arrangements – may or may not represent the interests of those victimized by noncompliance. Accordingly, the channels through which noncompliance is brought to light can be more complicated. In the next section, I address directly how international institutions provide compliance information. I ask and answer the question of who detects noncompliance, who brings it to light, and why. theory of monitoring arrangements To account for specific monitoring arrangements in different regimes, we need to examine the strategic environment in which they are devised and, accordingly, the incentives of states in designing international institutions.

Thus critical questions present themselves: do states have interests in monitoring and how do they pursue cost-effective monitoring arrangements? I argue that states’ interests, as well as their resource constraints and subsequent efforts to overcome such constraints, lead them to design monitoring arrangements in predictable ways. In particular, two factors – (1) the common or divergent interests between victims of noncompliance and their states and (2) the presence or absence of these victims as low-cost monitors – provide a concrete handle with which to address the empirical diversity of monitoring arrangements.

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