Some Topics in Two-person Games by T. Parthasarathy, T.E.S. Raghavan

By T. Parthasarathy, T.E.S. Raghavan

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The models assume instead that the volume of a bank’s loan portfolio is determined by the debtor side of the balance sheet. Here the models relax the premise of the current literature on economic capital that a bank should preserve a certain solvency level. 1 So with symmetric information about the credit standing of a bank, a risk increase of the bank’s loan portfolio has the following effects: It increases the insolvency probability of the bank and thereby worsens its credit standing. In an equilibrium, this leads to lower debt or a higher interest rate on debt.

1 So with symmetric information about the credit standing of a bank, a risk increase of the bank’s loan portfolio has the following effects: It increases the insolvency probability of the bank and thereby worsens its credit standing. In an equilibrium, this leads to lower debt or a higher interest rate on debt. The models do not assume that the bank trades assets on the capital market in the role of a price-taker and optimizes its portfolios based on a given utility function, as in Hart and Jaffee (1972).

14 However, this reasoning has a major drawback: If deposits are insured to a high degree - as holds true for most countries - and there are no significant costs depositors have to bear if a bank goes bankrupt, it cannot be argued anymore that bank runs are rationally triggered by information about the value of the bank’s assets. Instead, bank runs become highly irrational. So in real life, the linkage between financial distress and a bank run is weaker than this theory predicts. 15 The precondition for this behavior is that debtholders are sufficiently informed about the bank’s risk-taking.

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